NEW INTERVIEW: My interview with Eric Tan (Workers' Party Treasurer / East Coast GRC team) (full text), 2010.

My interview with Mr Eric Tan (then Workers’ Party Treasure and CEC member / East Coast GRC candidate, 2006 GE), Singapore, 3 March 2010.

By: Dr Kieran James.

(Interview time: two hours.)

Kieran James: Q1: Explain the events in your life that caused you to become an opposition supporter.

Eric Tan: I was in banking industry for 13 years; graduated in Engineering from NUS [National University of Singapore], did national service; I thought joining the government is a good thing, the decision can help many people. I joined and I faced elitism through real-life situations. I joined as graduate. They never distinguished between scholars, I joined MINDEF [Ministry of Defence]; I left disillusioned as the civil service was not what I thought; the government promotes scholars; they don’t appreciate benefits; salary not much above private sector. We are giving them people to run the country, some want to migrate. I went to Michigan to do MBA, I was recruited by Continental Bank Illinois (now Bank of America) in Chicago then in Singapore; I joined PAP, not the party but CC – residents’ consultancy.

In 1987 they detained Marxists, first I gave government benefit of the doubt. Communism was diminishing as a threat [and as an] ideology. Priest went to Australia, said the bishop was cornered, did not want to say guilty. [Edgar] De Souza said the only thing guilty of was forming opposition party, wanting to mount a political challenge; in those days big fear factor. Maybe some underlying ambition; they got detained and smashed. I felt that was quite wrong; they got JBJ [Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam], government can’t stop fax returns; I got fax of Privy Court judgement. Michael Khoo acquitted JBJ; that was the right thing to do. You can exclude cheque from a list of assets as it [can] bounce. I agreed with Michael Khoo’s judgement. PAP would not have got money anyway. Khoo felt it was not an asset yet so he did not make false declaration. Of course he wanted to divert assets away; it’s a political thing not a commercial thing. He was taken out of Parliament. These two episodes [Marxist Conspiracy and treatment of JBJ] changed my mind about PAP.

PAP was good at economic policies but in the 1990s the economy was unravelling. I experienced the value of the Singapore Dream going down. In 1987 $300k for private apartment, house $400k, semi-detached; we want to buy such a house. In 1992 apartment worth $1 million, house $2 million; at peak my apartment $1.6 million, house $2.6 million; now: $2 million and $4 million. Singapore Dream is gone. I could have bought it in 1991, I personally experienced that. People down the chain could still afford HDB [back in 1991]. That prompted me to say I had to do something; Goh Chok Tong became PM; he said “Swiss standard of living”, it rang hollow.

In 1996 GE [held in January 1997], I helped Chia Shi Teck, independent campaigner. I couldn’t help JBJ or Chiam as SDP fell apart. I felt JBJ was done a great injustice but his style of politics was very individualistic, he’s like Elvis Presley, he represents [the] brand of opposition. Chiam was shaken by Chee episode. Chia, ex-NMP [Nominated Member of Parliament], Establishment guy, spoke the language we can relate to; it’s more capitalist, more mercenary values we try to promote. Chia lost badly 12% [actual vote: 14.1%], he was disinterested. I had low expectations, Chia did poorly; the people want party branding.

I met [Wong] Wee Nam – the opposition are not bicycle thieves, I know the bike thief man in Workers’ Party, the old man didn’t really steal a bike. I met Wee Nam; they had professional team [contesting in Hong Kah GRC for National Solidarity Party, NSP]. WP chief Low [Thia Khiang] said: “I can’t do anything, JBJ runs the show.”

In 2001 Low took over party; at last we have a vehicle. Wee Nam did not want to stand. Low is not [the type of] guy to approach people personally. Everyone felt Low and WP brand is best so we all went under WP umbrella. Poh Lee Guan stood in Yishun East [officially Nee Soon East SMC] for WP. I helped him 2001; I was not ready to stand. … In 2001 [we contested in] … Yishun East and Hougang. We only contested in two single wards, relegated to backroom of opposition. NSP [National Solidarity Party] took limelight with Steve Chia as NCMP [Non-Constituency Member of Parliament, awarded to best losing opposition candidate in Singapore general elections],

2001-6. CSJ [Chee Soon Juan] bungled up. In’06 everyone had low expectations of the opposition given all the mess. WP could capture imagination, 20 candidates, well-scrubbed, like PAP people; I contested East Coast GRC in 2006. I left banking two-and-a-half years ago; employers are not comfortable you join opposition politics. British boss said: “As long as it’s not BSP, I support you.” [Note: The BSP refers to the British Socialist Party which was only active from 1911-1920; probably this was misheard by me or by Mr Tan, perhaps British National Party or BNP was said by the British boss instead.]  Now I’m director of educational institutes identifying good people to join University of Michigan.

2006 WP rise from the ashes. I’m working hard to get elected, full-time job. Campaign for the GRC centred [on] James Gomez; he said he submitted his form [Minority Race Certificate]; Election Department could not find it; CCTV said he put them in envelope; they said he had evil intent; PAP could not prove; he said “honest mistake”; this brought fear factor back. 2001 they went after Jufrie [Mohamed Jufrie bin Mahmood]; [Jufrie] quoted Koran; they said he is trying to stir up racial feelings. 06 pick on James; we were disciplined; we stuck together; Low and Sylvia [Lim] handled it; press wants to draw you away from party line. Always defamation threat if you call me [i.e. anyone] a liar. We all stayed together; said WP will stay disciplined; we concentrated on campaign; we had different policies; campaign went like a pendulum; we felt the pressure.

We had three teams: Ang Mo Kio GRC, all young, hard for PM to bag [criticize] them; Aljunied, so-called A-Team, both Aljunied and East Coast [teams] had strengths and weaknesses. Sylvia had limelight, two businessmen [Goh Meng Seng and Mohd. Rahizan bin Yaacob], one banker [Tan Wui Hua], James, research guy. Ours [East Coast GRC] was MNC-driven, corporate executives, Brandon [Siow] with SIA, one was lawyer [Chia Ti Lik], Malay candidate Rahim [Abdul Rahim bin Abdul Rahman] in town council. Aljunied was a mix of executives and businessmen. We had candidates PAP would have [been proud of]. Aljunied has benefit of Hougang spillover. Press said A-Team, B-Team. We were sheltered from firing. We said Sylvia and Low will handle James’ case.

People were positive towards the campaign; [they] felt we had good candidates; WP got 36% [actually 36.1%] [in East Coast GRC]; expectations of people are low, not politicized; not ready for opposition. People said “36% is good,” I was disappointed. People [are] not politicized; East Coast was not contested until 1991 [actually 1997]. People were not rude; I had no negative reaction. We said: “You need checks and balances.” 

’06 WP was ahead of PAP. We did not come out looking back, after James’ affair. People are not politicized; people don’t think [that their] vote will make a difference to their life. Well-off people say “we will migrate”; less well-off people say “it’s my plight and PAP [is] not so bad”. PAP ideology over time has got away with saying “we know what’s best for you,” you are [treated] like [you are] a little kid. We believe people should be empowered to make decisions; this is the only way we can compete in the developed world. We lack risk-takers who can deal with uncertainty. PAP has their ideology. WP says: “It’s not working and not natural and no society became prosperous doing what we are doing.” You can’t deliver the goods so we want just to be happy serfs. I may be before my time.

KJ: Q2: What do you think will happen to Singapore politics in next 10-15 years and how many seats will the opposition win at next election [2011GE]?

Eric Tan:  Next election will be defining moment. PAP is going through a transition; this will probably be last election for MM [Minister Mentor, then Mr Lee Kuan Yew]. If opposition does not get ten elected seats, it will be fragmented and marginalized. If we get status quo, opposition cause will be tough. Next election PAP could break up. 1959, still some left-over Labour Front, nine or ten non-PAP MPs. 1963, then people disappeared, people who are capable, who want to be PM; this will finally come home to roost when PM goes, real ruthless guy, people may come out of the woodwork. Gomez issue brought back fear factor to voters. Intellectuals got angry, they are the converted. PAP brings back fear factor each election; they got the fear. Fear and apathy are hallmarks of PAP ideology; let hearts and minds of people decide. I like LHL [Lee Hsien Loong]; he’s nice man but different ideology. I hope WP gets at least ten seats, jury [is] still out, we only have one seat in Parliament. In next election another party could overtake us [but] we have market share now. If we don’t get market share we can also be fragmented. Fragmented opposition is not good; one opposition party needs to be marginalized so that other people can move with … [the strongest opposition party; I could not keep up with the speed of Mr Tan’s words here.]

KJ: Q3: Do you think there is a chance of a breakaway party splitting off from PAP?

Eric Tan: It looks like all in PAP are well-paid and compliant. PAP does not choose strong people who will threaten stability, all must accept the order of the universe; GCT was seat-warmer, people don’t choose political schemers. Hard to see breakaway but many keep feelings to themselves. Another faction not in cabinet, second echelon not visible to public, could mount breakaway; the thirties and forties age [group]. Strongman dies, the party tends to break up, history shows. There could be pent-up unhappiness that shows up later, that can still happen, you can’t dismiss the possibilities. Beyond next election we can’t predict; it depends on people in their thirties now. My mission is to make a breakthrough in the elections. I’m adding stability to Singapore; I’m trying to make WP stable so new group does not come in with uncertain branding. Those coming to WP need the same ideology.

KJ: Q4: What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of the opposition parties?

Roderick Chia on the Monday after May 2011 GE.

Eric Tan: Part of WP ideology is we don’t speak badly about other opposition parties or PAP in public. We feel we are all on the same side of the fence but we don’t need to support them. They are different branding; SDP is western style engagement, pressure groups, protests outside parliamentary system as they feel that parliamentary system is unfair. This approach does not go down well with Singaporeans; they are not politicized; tell them you can do something with [their] votes; they don’t know their political rights. CSJ uses Hong Kong style, put pressure; get what you want. People are not ready for it. SDP brought down opposition cause, people are influenced by SDP actions that opposition is dangerous, a bull in a china shop. I have a right to say [that] I want to differentiate the branding. There is a split because of SDP although ideally we should work together.

KJ: Q5: What do you think of Singapore Democratic Party Youth and internet political activism?

Eric Tan: There are young activists, internet world; real-world. A lot don’t read internet, thirties and forties. We [WP] connect, we work hard, we knock on doors, we are brute force; they are high-profile. We are not as aggressive as SDP but Singapore people don’t want to destabilize PAP; people [are] not at the point [where] they want to change government. SDP imposes strong cures; [but] you have to convince people [that] life can be better; it’s not like Mandela during apartheid. … We have Facebook connections, not as active; SDP has nice website, ours is more passive; we have other mediums, we have got two contrasting parties and leaders; everyone does their own thing. Chee and Low are night and day. SDP is the big-bang approach; “we tell you this,” “you come to us,” “it was us all along,” but have they the skill-set to run a country or a town-council? I wish younger guys come and use us as a vehicle. They may feel we are boring farts and join SDP; that’s life, so be it.

Our content style is mainstream; Chee says: “This is my agenda and we don’t care [about] the rest of you.” WP has a strength as Low is Chinese-educated; you have to pay your dues. You need to get a set-up of people who collectively believe in ideas and act on it and make it happen as a group. You need to make it happen. We don’t just need more ideas. I hope one day there will be a breakthrough.

KJ: Q6: What do the opposition parties need to do to go from 25% to 50.1% and what type of people make up that next 25% that the opposition must win over?

Yaw Shin Leong and Kieran James, 5 October 2011.

Eric Tan: The old days, the bottom 20% or 30% are mostly the underclass and minority population. After 1991-Eunos GRC, [PAP] almost lost [final vote-count was: PAP 52.4% defeated WP 47.6%]; PAP knew they nearly lost; underclass was huge. GCT focused on this group; it shrunk from 35% to 20%; there will always be this 20%; we must capture the middle-ground as that’s how to change the country; we have to look at the middle group; they are not in love with us. We get 25%, we need them, PAP has maybe 30% diehards; they really believe PAP policy is good for them, we respect that. Next 20% or 30% is upper middle-class who can see through the deceit; [people] who can see that life will be tougher next 10-20 years; we want to cultivate them. PAP gives a lot of benefit to underclass now, hard to convert them; three or four-room flat people are for you or against you and fear factor is very high. This depends on PAP policy, [it’s] not within our power to convert them. You need to show them you have sincere and credible people. Next group is landed and condo people; PAP look at very top and very bottom end; upper middle-class is next group, less fear factor; I hope we can convince them; I think we have a chance; Chee may be looking for this group too.

KJ: Q7: What are the main Workers’ Party values?

Eric Tan: Main WP values are egalitarian society with more social [safety] nets; we believe in justice and fair-play and fewer monopolies; and anti-trust group to see that GLCs don’t bully SMEs. We believe in lowering cost-of-living in Singapore for essential goods; transportation should be cost-recovery; PAP style is to make money.

KJ: Q8: Would you call the party’s ideology socialist?

Roderick Chia, Dr Kieran James, Jarrod Luo.

Eric Tan: To some extent socialist; we are centre-left; we think PAP infrastructure is not so bad or we would not have become prosperous. Chee is in his [own] world. I chose this path for my personal reasons and I should not hold it against the whole society that it owes me a living. I’m not a hero or anything like that. You cannot doubt [that] LKY loves Singapore first but maybe it was [also] convenient for his own ambitions. The agendas coincide. He wanted to create something for his own ambitions. He thought he might be PM of Malaysia; he wanted Malaysian Malaysia. When I was young I thought he really loved Singapore but he played important role in making the country prosperous; you can’t take that away from him.

We need to work out what we need for Singapore going forward. I’m against the elite-creation model, it’s unnatural, I saw it in MINDEF; … we are unnatural, you can’t do it the way the rest of the world does? It’s all competition of ideas. 1959, left-wing was strongest group, not necessarily communists; the Chinese-educated had grievances; it was hard to get jobs under British regime. Left-wing was unhappy and PAP left-wing captured that group. They knew [that] PAP would win in 1959 but they work with LKY. They set up WP and they needed someone who would look like LKY; they chose David Marshall as front guy; they came from same group of people as PAP. LKY said communists controlled PAP, WP. He said he wanted one WP member to step down and it happened. 1963, WP became redundant and Marshall resigned. Barisan Sosialis took up the cause. Chinese-educated WP was going to give announcement in Chinese; there was mistranslation about agreeing to merger terms. Marshall resigned and party became dormant for many years. Left-wing group thought [there was] no use for it. 1971, JBJ took over the party until 2001; branding was JBJ, confrontational; need for opposition; light in the darkness. Chee sees rise in Christian megachurches. I didn’t agree with Chee destroying SDP; he thought of himself and not the cause; why not start a new party? Chee, Jurong 24% [actually SDP, headed by CSJ, scored 20.2% in Jurong GRC at 2001GE]; Steve Chia did better [scoring 39.6% in Chua Chu Kang SMC at 2006GE]; I knock on doors and 20% to 30% [of people] say: “don’t be like CSJ.”

KJ: Q9: What is the secret of Mr Low Thia Khiang’s electoral success?

Eric Tan: Low wins due to his sincerity; he gets back to basics; walks the ground; meets people and helps their issues; he does charity work but doesn’t want publicity; Chee is not like that. Low does not need the branding. Low did not visit funerals until after he was elected; they are a very sensitive thing; they see them as bad luck. If you come and you don’t come Chinese consider it very important; it’s a big deal because to go means bad luck. He was lucky to get in [Hougang SMC, 1991GE] but he held on to it. Chiam is like a childhood village head that makes the difference [all by himself]. Low’s thinking is that people want a PAP-style [of politics]; he does not want to look ridiculous; his style of branding is middle-of-the-road; he could not get Sylvia with the branding; his next challenge is to get us in.

Young people will not trust our branding; we probably have more activists than SDP. We visit the ground every Sunday; does SDP do that consistently? My daughters, Ann and Bernadette, then 15-year-old twins, had articles in there. [Note: Mr Tan is referring to the WP book Days of Being Wild published in 2006.]

KJ: Q10: Why do you think it is only Chiam and Low who are able to win seats?

Eric Tan: Chiam and Low had non-GRC window, 1984 and 1991; people were more politicized; they were credible; they [the voters] know there are no fears. The problem now is the GRC; he used upgrading threat. A big enigma, number one, as you say, [is] why Chiam and Low only win. If we learn this secret we can win.

KJ: Q11: Would you consider approaching Dr Wong as a potential WP candidate as part of a possible GRC super-team?

Eric Tan: Wong [Wee Nam] is not a pragmatist; he becomes irrelevant person; you need party discipline; he has not run again for election; super GRC team could not work.

KJ: Q12: Do you think the opposition should work harder to win over new migrants?

Eric Tan: 80%-90% of new migrants support PAP; mainland Chinese who come here know who butters their bread; they don’t want to upset people; their citizenship might be conditional on good behaviour. Whether SDP like it or not, Chiam and Low won elections; without winning an election you have no power-base and you have achieved nothing. So, Chee, win a bloody election!

****END OF INTERVIEW (12:20 p.m. on 3 March 2010)****

References cited here

Lam, Dana (2006) Days of being wild: GE2006 Walking the line with the opposition (Singapore: Ethos Books).